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vector autoregressive models to study monetary transmission in various countries. 
We find some evidence of publication selection against the price puzzle in the 
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shocks depends on the characteristics of the economy. 
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One of the major peculiarities of vector autoregressions, the dominant framework for the em-
pirical analysis of monetary policy, is the counterintuitive rise in prices often reported in these
models to follow a monetary contraction. The so-called price puzzle is encountered by about a
half of all empirical studies, and in many of them the puzzle is even statistically signicant. In
this paper we collect 70 published studies using vector autoregressions to examine the eects
of monetary policy. Employing meta-regression analysis, a quantitative method of research
synthesis, we investigate which aspects of methodology systematically contribute to reporting
the price puzzle. The meta-regression analysis also shows how the characteristics of the coun-
tries examined inuence the reported shape of the impulse responses and thus help explain the
cross-country heterogeneity in monetary transmission.
We evaluate the reported graphs of impulse responses at ve time horizons (representing the
short, medium, and long run) and for each horizon extract the numerical value of the impulse
response. In this way we collect more than 1,000 estimates, 210 on average for each horizon;
the estimates summarize evidence from 31 countries and were produced by 103 researchers. We
present a method of research synthesis suitable for graphical results such as impulse responses
and employ modern meta-analysis methods to examine the extent of publication selection bias
(the preference of authors, editors, or referees for some particular results based on signicance
or consistency with theory).
Our results indicate some evidence of publication selection against the price puzzle, and the
selection seems to strengthen for responses with longer horizons after monetary tightening. The
nding is in line with Doucouliagos & Stanley (2008), who suggest that publication selection
is likely to be stronger for research areas with less theory competition. In macroeconomics,
agreement exists about the eects of monetary policy on prices in the long run: prices should
eventually decrease after a contraction. On the other hand, a smaller consensus arises regarding
the exact eects of monetary policy in the short run because of the uncertainty caused by
transmission lags. Published results often exhibit the price puzzle for the short run; on the
contrary, results showing the price puzzle for the long run would be dicult to publish.
The reported impulse responses are systematically aected by study design and country-
specic characteristics. Study design is important in particular for the short run: the reported
short-run increase in prices after a tightening is well explained by the eects of commonly
questioned aspects of methodology, such as the omission of commodity prices, the omission of
potential output, or the use of recursive identication. When these aspects of methodology are
ltered out, the average impulse-response function inferred from the entire literature becomes
hump-shaped with no evidence of the price puzzle. Based on such \best-practice" impulse re-
sponse the maximum decrease in prices following a one-percentage-point increase in the interest
rate is 0.33% and occurs already half a year after the tightening.
Our results suggest that heterogeneity between countries is important for the long-run re-
sponse of prices to monetary policy action. Structural characteristics such as GDP growth,
1average ination, and openness, as well as institutional characteristics such as nancial devel-
opment and central bank independence, determine the strength of transmission.
1 Introduction
How does monetary policy aect the price level? This fundamental question of monetary eco-
nomics still ranks among the most controversial when it comes to empirical evidence. Although
intuition and stylized macro models suggest that prices should decrease following a surprise
increase in interest rates, empirical ndings often challenge the theory. About 50% of modern
studies using vector autoregressions (VARs) to investigate the eects of monetary policy report
that after a tightening prices actually increase, at least in the short run. Beginning with Sims
(1992), many dierent solutions to the \price puzzle" have been proposed, varying from alleged
misspecications of VARs (Bernanke et al., 2005) to theoretical models that try to justify the
observed rise in prices (Rabanal, 2007).
Depending on the point of view, the price puzzle casts serious doubts either on the ability
of VAR models to correctly identify monetary policy shocks, or on the ability of central banks
to control ination in the short run, or both. Since macroeconomists have produced a plethora
of empirical research on the topic, it seems natural to ask what general eect the literature im-
plies. The method designed to answer such questions is meta-analysis, a quantitative method of
research synthesis commonly used in economics (Smith & Huang, 1995; Stanley, 2001; Disdier
& Head, 2008; Card et al., 2010), which can provide a unifying framework for this stream of
literature. In contrast to narrative literature surveys, meta-analysis takes into account pos-
sible publication selection, the preference of authors, editors, or referees for results that are
statistically signicant or consistent with the theory, a bias that has become a great concern
in empirical economic research (DeLong & Lang, 1992; Card & Krueger, 1995; Ashenfelter &
Greenstone, 2004; Stanley, 2008).
Meta-analysis enables researchers to examine the systematic dependencies of reported re-
sults on study design and to separate the wheat from the cha by ltering out the eects of
misspecications. Meta-analysis can create a synthetic study with ideal parameters, such as the
maximum breadth of data or a consensus best-practice methodology, and, in our case, estimates
the underlying eect of monetary policy corrected for potential misspecication and publica-
tion biases. Furthermore, meta-analysis makes it possible to investigate how the strength of
monetary transmission depends on the characteristics of the countries examined. In this paper
we attempt to collect all published studies examining monetary transmission within a VAR
framework and extract point estimates of impulse responses together with the corresponding
condence bounds. We investigate the degree of publication selection, the role of model mis-
specication for the occurrence of the price puzzle, and the factors underlying the heterogeneity
of price responses to monetary shocks across countries and over time.
Based on the mixed-eects multilevel model we illustrate how meta-analysis is able to disen-
tangle various factors causing researchers to encounter the price puzzle. We show that when best
practice is followed, the researcher is likely to nd that prices decrease signicantly soon after a
2monetary tightening. Our results thus suggest that the puzzle stems from model misspecica-
tion rather than from the real behavior of prices. In addition, the results indicate publication
selection in favor of the negative responses of prices to a monetary contraction. Finally, the
analysis of the determinants of transmission heterogeneity suggests that monetary policy has a
stronger eect on prices in more open economies, in countries with a more independent central
bank, and during economic downturns.
The remainder of the paper has the following structure. Section 2 describes how we collected
the estimates from VAR models. Section 3 reviews the suggested solutions to the price puzzle.
Section 4 tests for publication selection bias and for the underlying eect of monetary tightening
on prices. Section 5 models method and structural heterogeneity among impulse responses.
Section 6 concludes. Appendix A provides additional robustness checks, and Appendix B lists
all the studies used to construct the data set.
2 The Impulse Responses Data Set
Ever since the seminal contribution of Sims (1980), VARs have been the dominant tool for in-
vestigating monetary transmission. Researchers using VARs to examine the impact of monetary
policy usually assume that the economy can be described by the following dynamic model:
AYt = B(L)Yt 1 + "t; (1)
where Yt is a vector of endogenous variables typically containing a measure of output, prices,
interest rates, and, in the case of a small open economy, the exchange rate. Matrix A describes
contemporaneous relationships between endogenous variables, B(L) is a matrix lag polynomial,
and "t is a vector of structural shocks with the variance-covariance matrix E("t"0
t) = I. The
system is called the structural-form VAR. In order to estimate it, researchers rewrite the system
to its reduced form:
Yt = C(L)Yt 1 + ut; (2)
where the elements of matrix C(L) are the convolutions of the elements of matrices A and
B, and ut is a vector of reduced-form shocks with the variance-covariance matrix E(utu0
t) =
; the relationship between structural shocks and reduced-form residuals is "t = Aut. The
dynamic responses of endogenous variables to structural shocks can be studied by impulse-
response functions.
Figure 1 presents two stylized types of the price level's impulse responses to a monetary
tightening. The left panel demonstrates the price puzzle: prices increase signicantly in the
short run, while in contrast, the right panel shows a response which corresponds with the
mainstream prior: the price level declines soon after a tightening.
The rst step of meta-analysis is to select the studies to be included. While some meta-
analysts use both published and unpublished studies, others conne their sample to journal
articles (for instance, Abreu et al., 2005). Including working papers and mimeographs in meta-
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Intuitive response
analysis does not help alleviate publication bias: if journals systematically prefer certain results,
rational authors will already adopt the same preference in the earlier stages of research as
they prepare for journal submission. Indeed, empirical evidence suggests no dierence in the
magnitude of publication bias between published and unpublished studies (see the meta-analysis
of 65 meta-analyses by Doucouliagos & Stanley, 2008). And even if there was a dierence,
modern meta-regression methods not only identify but also lter out the bias. Therefore, as a
preliminary and simple criterion of quality, we only consider articles published in peer-reviewed
journals or in handbooks (such as the Handbook of Macroeconomics).
The following literature search strategy was employed. First, we examined two literature
surveys (Stock & Watson, 2001; Egert & MacDonald, 2009) and set up a search query able to
capture most of the relevant studies; we searched both the EconLit and RePEc databases. Next,
we checked the references of studies published in 2010 and the citations of the most widely cited
study in the VAR literature, Christiano et al. (1999). After going through the abstracts of all
identied studies, we selected 195 that showed any promise of containing empirical estimates of
impulse responses and examined them in detail. The search was terminated on September 15,
2010.
To be able to use meta-analysis methods fully, we exclude the studies that omit to report
condence intervals around impulse responses. Unfortunately, we thus have to exclude some
seminal articles such as Sims (1992) or a few recent studies that estimate time-varying-parameter
VARs. To obtain a more homogeneous sample we only focus on studies that dene a monetary
policy shock as a shock in the interest rate. A number of studies investigate the change in the
monetary base; since Bernanke & Blinder (1992) and Sims (1992), however, the majority of the
literature investigates interest rate shocks because most central banks now use the interest rate
as their main policy instrument. We only include studies examining the response of the price
level; a minority of studies examine the responses of the ination rate. These incorporation
criteria leave 70 studies in our database. The full list of studies included in the data set can
be found in Appendix B, and the list of excluded studies is presented in the online appendix at
meta-analysis.cz/price puzzle.
4Considering the richness and heterogeneity of the empirical evidence on the eects of mon-
etary policy, it is surprising there has been no quantitative synthesis using modern meta-
regression methods.1 One reason is that the results are typically presented in the form of
graphs instead of numerical values, and the graphs contain estimates for many time horizons
following the monetary policy shock. Researchers usually investigate up to 36- or 48-month hori-
zons when using monthly data and up to 20 quarters when using quarterly data; it is unclear
which horizon should be chosen to summarize the eect.
Our meta-analysis is designed in the following way. We extract responses at 3- and 6-month
horizons to capture the short-run eect, at 12- and 18-month horizons to capture the medium-
run eect, and at the 36-month horizon to capture the long-run eect. We enlarge the graphs
of impulse responses and using pixel coordinates we measure the response and its condence
bounds. The graphs of all impulse responses as well as the extracted values are available in
the online appendix. The resulting measurement error is random, similar to the rounding error
in numerical outcomes, and thus inevitable in a meta-analysis.
The extracted values must be transformed into a common metric to ensure that the estimates
are comparable. To standardize the estimates to represent the eect of a one-percentage-point
increase in the interest rate, we divide the responses by the magnitude of the monetary policy
shock used in the study.2 In the case of factor-augmented VAR (FAVAR) studies, where the
responses are usually given in standard-deviation units, we normalize the responses by the
standard deviation of the particular time series.
Since the condence intervals around the impulse response estimates are often asymmetrical
(condence intervals are usually bootstrapped; Sims & Zha, 1999), the standard errors of the
estimates cannot be obtained directly. In this case we approximate the standard error by the
distance from the point estimate to the condence bound closer to zero; that is, we take the lower
condence bound for positive responses and the upper bound for negative responses. This bound
determines signicance and would be associated with potential publication selection. Should we
use the average of the distance to both condence bounds, the inference would remain similar;
these additional results are available in the online appendix. When the reported condence
interval is presented in standard-deviation units (for example, +/  two standard deviations),
we can immediately approximate the standard error. Otherwise, we proceed as if the estimates
were symmetrically distributed and assume that, for example, the 68% condence interval
represents an interval of one standard error around the mean.
Following the recent trend in meta-analysis (Disdier & Head, 2008; Doucouliagos & Stanley,
2009), we use all reported estimates from the 70 primary studies. Arbitrarily selecting the
\best" estimate or using the average reported estimate would discard a great deal of useful
information about the dierences in methods within one study. We do not clean the data set:
rather, for all regressions we evaluate the stability of coecients employing the random sample
1To our knowledge, there has been one unpublished meta-analysis on the impact of monetary policy on prices
(de Grauwe & Storti, 2004) and focused solely on heterogeneity in the reported estimates; that is, it did not lter
out publication bias and misspecications to estimate the underlying impulse response. We also use four times
more point estimates of impulse responses and three times more variables that explain heterogeneity.
2When we were uncertain about the magnitude of shock used in the primary study, we contacted the authors.
5method, which replicates the regression 1,000 times with a subset of 80% of the original data set.
This sensitivity analysis, presented in the online appendix, indicates that our results are robust
to outliers. In addition the method of meta-analysis includes a built-in robustness check|for
instance the current version of the manuscript covers 10% more studies than the rst draft, yet
the results remain qualitatively identical.
The number of impulse responses collected for each of the horizons is approximately 210,
which in total amounts to more than 1,000 point estimates. More specically, we collect 208
estimates for the 3-month horizon, 215 for the 6- and 12-month horizons, 217 for the 18-month
horizon, and 205 for the 36-month horizon. For comparison, consider Nelson & Kennedy (2009),
who review 140 economic meta-analyses and report that the median analysis only uses 92 point
estimates from 33 primary studies. The oldest study in our sample was published in 1992 and
the median study was published in 2006, the data set covers evidence from 31 countries, and we
build upon the work of 103 researchers. The median time span of the data used by the primary
studies is 1980{2002. All studies in the sample combined receive approximately 800 citations
in Google Scholar per year, indicating the inuence of VARs in monetary economics.
3 Collecting the Pieces of the Puzzle
To motivate the selection of explanatory variables in the multivariate meta-regression analysis
(Section 5), we now briey review the solutions to the price puzzle that have been proposed in
the literature. Most of these remedies have proven to alleviate the puzzle in some cases; none
of them, though, has been fully successful in solving it. Table 1 demonstrates that from the
208 estimates collected for the 3-month horizon, exactly a half exhibit the price puzzle, and
in 15% of the estimates the puzzle is even statistically signicant at the 5% level. The table
summarizes the eectiveness of the dierent solutions to the puzzle. Even in the case of the
most eective solution, 24% of specications still exhibit the puzzle (except for sign restrictions,
which in some cases, however, represent a tautological solution).
Table 1: Eectiveness of the suggested solutions to the price puzzle
Methodology used in the estimation
All Commodity Trend/Gap Single FAVAR SVAR Sign
Responses estimated 208 125 33 64 11 60 31
Price puzzle present 104 61 8 24 8 20 3
Price puzzle signicant 32 16 1 5 3 6 0
Note: Commodity = Commodity prices are included in the VAR, Trend/Gap = time trend or output gap is included,
Single = the VAR is estimated on the sample containing a single monetary policy regime, FAVAR = a factor-augmented
VAR is estimated, SVAR = non-recursive identication is used, Sign = shocks are identied by imposing sign restrictions,
not necessarily on prices.
3.1 Omitted Variables
Commodity Prices According to Sims (1992) the price puzzle occurs because central banks
are forward-looking and react to the anticipated future movements of ination by raising the
6interest rate. When a VAR system omits information about future ination, the examined
shocks become the combinations of true monetary policy shocks and endogenous reactions to
expected ination. If the central bank does not fully accommodate the expected ination, the
data might show that an increase in the interest rate, mistakenly recognized as a monetary policy
shock, is followed by an increase in the price level. Sims (1992) nds that including commodity
prices into the VAR mitigates the price puzzle. Nevertheless, as follows from Table 1, the
inclusion of commodity prices does not solve the puzzle automatically|in fact, it seems to help
little.
Output Gap Giordani (2004) argues that the use of GDP in the VAR system without con-
trolling for the potential of the economy can bias the estimates and cause the price puzzle. He
claims that commodity prices alleviate the puzzle mostly because they contain useful informa-
tion about the output gap, not just because they are a good predictor of future ination. In a
similar vein, Hanson (2004) examines a battery of other indicators and nds little correlation
between the ability to solve the price puzzle and the ability to forecast ination. Approximately
16% of specications in our sample use the output gap (or add a time trend), but some of them
still encounter the puzzle.
Factor-augmented VAR To address the major shortcomings of standard small-scale VARs,
Bernanke et al. (2005) introduce the factor-augmented VAR approach. They argue that, in
practice, policymakers take into account hundreds of variables when deciding about monetary
policy. Standard VAR models with typically three to six variables may therefore suer from
omitted-variable bias; the FAVAR approach, on the other hand, makes use of additional informa-
tion by extracting principal components from many time series. Nonetheless, simple summary
statistics in Table 1 indicate that FAVAR is not particularly eective in explaining the puzzle
away.
3.2 Identication
While some researchers stress the role of omitted variables, others argue that the puzzle arises
from implausible identication of monetary policy shocks. The usual recursive identication,
which assumes that monetary policy aects output and prices only with a lag, is, for example,
not consistent with the New-Keynesian class of theoretical models (Carlstrom et al., 2009).3
Non-recursive Identication Kim (1999) and Kim & Roubini (2000) introduced and ap-
plied a non-recursive method for the identication of shocks. The main idea, going back to
Bernanke (1986) and Blanchard & Watson (1986), says that the matrix contemporaneously
linking structural shocks and reduced-form residuals is no longer lower triangular, but that it
3Romer & Romer (2004) point out that the traditional indicators (money supply and interest rates) contain
anticipatory movements that might contaminate estimated monetary policy shocks. By using quantitative and
narrative records from the Federal Open Market Committee meetings they produce a measure of monetary policy
shocks based on changes in the intended federal funds rate and the Fed's expectations on future ination and
output.
7assumes a general form indicated by theory: the rows of the matrix have a structural interpre-
tation. The restrictions presented by Kim & Roubini (2000) are elicited from the structural
stochastic equilibrium model developed by Sims & Zha (1998).
Alternatively, researchers may impose a long-run restriction in order to identify monetary
policy shocks; this approach is pursued by Blanchard & Quah (1989) and Clarida & Gali
(1994), who only allow technological shocks to have a permanent eect on economic activity.
Recently Bjornland & Leitemo (2009) combine short-run and long-run restrictions. Although
non-recursive identication is appealing, in almost 33% of the responses computed using this
strategy the price puzzle still occurs.
Sign Restrictions Faust (1998), Canova & Nicolo (2002), and Uhlig (2005) present a novel
identication approach that assigns structural interpretation to orthogonal innovations by im-
posing sign restriction on the responses to shocks. The method is attractive since sign restric-
tions can be derived from the canonical dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model.
The use of sign restrictions in VARs has recently been criticized by Fry & Pagan (2011): because
impulse responses do not come from a common model, the shocks may not be orthogonal. Fry &
Pagan (2011) argue that sign restrictions need not generate better quantitative estimates than
recursive methods. Nevertheless, as Table 1 documents, VARs estimated with sign restrictions
rarely encounter the price puzzle.
3.3 Monetary Policy Regime
Another stream of literature suggests that the puzzle is historically limited to periods of passive
monetary policy4 or that it emerges when the data mix dierent monetary regimes (Elbourne
& de Haan, 2006; Borys et al., 2009). For example, if a researcher assumes that the central
bank uses the interest rate to target ination, although for some part of the sample monetary
or exchange rate targeting was in place, monetary policy shocks in the VAR system become
incorrectly identied.
Hanson (2004) shows that neither commodity prices nor other indicators are able to solve the
price puzzle in the 1959{1979 period, suggesting that the puzzle is associated with that period.
Similar results are reported by Castelnuovo & Surico (2010), who nd the price puzzle in the
pre-1979 sample even after controlling for the output gap. This nding has been reported mainly
for the United States, but Benati (2008) presents similar evidence for the United Kingdom.
3.4 Cost Channel
A decrease in the price level following a tightening of monetary policy is predicted by stylized
theoretical models stressing the importance of the demand channel of transmission. On the
other hand, Barth & Ramey (2002) emphasize the supply-side eects and present evidence for
4Monetary policy is considered passive when it violates the so-called Taylor principle. The Taylor principle
requires the central bank to suciently increase the interest rate after a positive shock to ination expectations,
so that the real interest rate also increases (Clarida et al., 2000).
8the so-called cost channel. Since rms depend on credit to nance production, their costs rise
when the central bank increases the interest rate, and they may increase prices. In this view the
price puzzle does not stem from methodological problems in VARs, but represents a genuine
response to monetary tightening when the cost channel dominates the demand channel.
For the United States, Christiano et al. (2005) build a DSGE model incorporating the cost
channel, but only nd a minor role for it. In a similar vein the results of Rabanal (2007) suggest
that the demand-side eects of monetary policy dominate the supply-side eects, thus leaving
the cost channel relatively unimportant. Henzel et al. (2009) come to similar conclusions for
the euro area.
4 Consequences of Publication Selection
After we have collected about 1,000 estimates of the response of prices to monetary tightening,
a natural question arises: what general impulse response does the literature suggest? Meta-
analysis was originally developed in medicine to combine many small studies into a large one,
and therefore to boost the number of degrees of freedom. Clinical trials are costly, and meta-
analysis thus became the dominant method of taking stock of medical research. Estimating a
VAR model may be less expensive, but the degrees of freedom in macroeconomics are limited.
Hence, the original purpose of meta-analysis is useful even here since it combines information
from many countries and time periods: when recomputed into quarters the primary studies in
our sample taken together use 2,452 unique observations.
Taking a simple mean of all point estimates for each of the ve horizons implies the impulse-
response function depicted in Figure 2. This average impulse response shows a relatively intu-
itive short-run reaction of prices to a one-percentage-point increase in the interest rate: prices
decline already in the short run, the decrease becomes signicant in the medium run and reaches
0.56% after 36 months. The response shows no sign of bottoming out.
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9Simply averaging the collected impulse responses has two major shortcomings. First, it ig-
nores possible publication selection. If some results are more likely to get published than others,
the average becomes a biased estimator of the underlying impulse response. Second, it ignores
heterogeneity in the results of the primary studies. Since dierent researchers use dierent data
and methods, and the studies are of dierent quality, it is unrealistic to assume that all esti-
mates are drawn from the same population. In addition, as discussed in Section 3, some VAR
models are misspecied, and if misspecications have a systematic inuence on the results, it
may be possible to improve upon the average response by ltering out the misspecications.
We address publication selection in this section and heterogeneity and misspecication issues
in Section 5.
Stanley (2008), among others, points out that publication selection is of major concern
for empirical research in economics. When there is little theory competition for what sign the
underlying eect should have, estimates inconsistent with the predominant theory will be treated
with suspicion or even be discarded. An illustrative example can be found in the literature on
the eect of a common currency on trade (Rose & Stanley, 2005): it is hard to defend negative
estimates of the trade eect of currency unions. The negative estimates most likely result from
misspecication, and researchers may be correct in not stressing them. On the other hand,
it is far more dicult to identify excessively large estimates of the same eect that also arise
from misspecications. No specic threshold exists above which the estimate would become
suspicious. If researchers include the large positive estimates but omit the negative ones, the
inference will be on average biased toward a stronger eect.
Similar selection, perhaps of lower intensity, may be taking place in the VAR literature
on monetary transmission as well (Uhlig, 2010, p. 17, provides anecdotal evidence). Some
researchers treat the price puzzle as a clear indication of a misspecication error and try to
nd an intuitive impulse response for interpretation. Statistical signicance is also important.
Signicant impulse responses are more convenient for interpretation, and especially researchers
in central banks may be interested in reporting a well-functioning monetary transmission with
a signicant reaction of prices to a change in monetary policy. The selection for signicance
does not distort the average estimate from the literature if the true underlying eect equals
zero, but otherwise it creates a bias, again in favor of a stronger eect since estimates with the
wrong sign are less likely to be signicant.
A common way to detect publication selection is an informal examination of a so-called fun-
nel plot (Stanley & Doucouliagos, 2010). The funnel plot depicts the estimates on the horizontal
axis against their precision (the inverse of the standard error) on the vertical axis. If there is no
heterogeneity or misspecication, the estimates with the highest precision will be close to the
true underlying eect. In the absence of publication selection the funnel is symmetrical: the
reported estimates are dispersed randomly around the true eect. The asymmetry of the funnel
plot suggests publication bias; for example, if estimates with a positive sign are less likely to
be selected for publication, estimates on the right side of the funnel will be underrepresented.
10The funnel plots for all ve horizons are depicted in Figure 3.5 The plots resemble funnels
commonly reported in economic meta-analyses, which indicates that the employed approxima-
tion of standard errors is plausible. As expected, the left part of all funnels is clearly heavier,
suggesting publication selection against the price puzzle and in favor of the more negative (that
is, stronger) eects of monetary tightening on prices. Nevertheless, the interpretation of funnel
plots is subjective, and a more formal test of publication bias is required.
Given small samples, authors wishing to obtain signicant results may be tempted to try
dierent specications until they nd estimates large enough to oset the standard errors. In
contrast, with large samples even tiny estimates might be statistically signicant, and authors
therefore have fewer incentives to conduct a specication search. If publication selection is
present, we should observe a relationship between an estimate and its standard error (or the
square root of the number of observations). The following regression formalizes the idea (Card
& Krueger, 1995):
^ j =  + 0SEj + ej; (3)
where  denotes the true underlying eect, ^ j denotes the eect's j-th estimate, 0 denotes
the magnitude of publication bias, SEj denotes the standard error of ^ j, and ej denotes a
disturbance term.
Specication (3) has become the cornerstone of modern meta-analysis in medicine and the
social sciences, including economics. The question is whether the method is suitable for sum-
marizing graphical results such as impulse responses. In order for this meta-analysis method
to be valid, the distribution of empirical eects needs to be symmetrical in the absence of pub-
lication bias (usually it is assumed that the disturbance term in (3) is normally distributed).
But impulse responses are nonlinear functions of the coecients estimated in the VAR system;
as discussed in Section 2, the condence intervals around the individual estimates are often
asymmetrical. If the pattern of asymmetry is not random across the individual estimates, the
distribution of the impulse responses will not be symmetrical even in the absence of publication
bias, and the test for publication bias will be invalid.
Systematic asymmetry of the distribution of impulse responses would manifest as a signi-
cant dierence between the average distance from the point estimate of the impulse response to
the lower and upper condence bound. We select the 68% condence bound, which for a sym-
metrical distribution would mean a distance of one standard error on both sides of the mean.
The dierence of the distances is signicant at the 5% level for only one out of ve horizons
(the 12-month horizon), and even there the dierence is small: the average lower condence
interval is 11.6% further from the mean. It is unlikely that such a small dierence could ex-
plain the degree of asymmetry apparent from Figure 3. It cannot explain the asymmetry of
the distribution of the collected point estimates of the impulse responses at the 12-month hori-
zon, where the distance from the 16th to the 50th percentile is 53.1% larger than the distance
from the 50th to the 84th percentile. For this reason, we employ the standard meta-analysis
5A few outlying estimates are trimmed from the funnels to ensure that the main pattern is clearly observable.




































































































































































































































































































































































12methodology|bearing in mind that the results concerning publication bias must be interpreted
with some caution.
In practice, meta-analysts rarely estimate specication (3) directly since it suers from
heteroscedasticity by denition (the explanatory variable is a sample estimate of the standard
deviation of the response variable). Instead, weighted least squares are used to gain eciency,









+ j; jjSEj  N(0;2); (4)
where tj denotes the approximated t-statistic of the estimate, and the new disturbance term
j has constant variance. Note that the intercept and the slope are now reversed: the slope
measures the true eect, and the intercept measures publication bias. In addition to removing
heteroscedasticity, specication (4) gives more weight to more precise results, which represents
a common approach in meta-analysis. Testing the signicance of 0 in this specication is
analogous to testing the asymmetry of the funnel plot|it follows from rotating the funnel plot
and dividing the values on the new vertical axis by SEj. Testing the signicance of  constitutes
a test for the true underlying eect of monetary tightening on prices, corrected for publication
selection.
Since we use all reported impulse responses we need to account for the potential dependence
of estimates within one study (Disdier & Head, 2008); in such case, (4) would be misspecied.
As a remedy, researchers typically employ the mixed-eects multilevel model (Doucouliagos &
Stanley, 2009):





+ j + ij; jjSEij  N(0; ); ijjSEij;j  N(0;); (5)
where i and j denote estimate and study subscripts. The overall error term now consists of
study-level random eects and estimate-level disturbances (ij = j + ij), and its variance is
additive since both components are assumed to be independent: Var(ij) =   + , where  
denotes between-study variance and  within-study variance. If   approaches zero the benet
of using the mixed-eect estimator instead of ordinary least squares (OLS) dwindles. To put
the magnitude of these variance terms into perspective the within-study correlation is useful:
  Cor(ij;i0j) =  =(  + ), which expresses the degree of dependence of estimates reported
in the same study, or equivalently, the degree of between-study heterogeneity.
The mixed-eects multilevel model is analogous to the random-eects model commonly used
in panel-data econometrics. We follow the terminology from multilevel data modeling, which
calls the model \mixed eects" since it contains a xed () as well as a random part (j). For
the purposes of meta-analysis the multilevel framework is more suitable because it takes into
account the unbalancedness of the data (the restricted maximum likelihood estimator is used
instead of generalized least squares), allows for nesting multiple random eects (study-, author-,
13or country-level), and is thus more exible (Nelson & Kennedy, 2009).
Table 2: Test of true eect and publication bias
Mixed-eects multilevel
Horizon 3 months 6 months 12 months 18 months 36 months




(0.167) (0.166) (0.145) (0.128) (0.126)
1/SE (eect) 0.009 0.007 -0.014 -0.019 -0.009
(0.009) (0.011) (0.014) (0.012) (0.010)
Within-study correlation 0.43 0.56 0.46 0.41 0.14
Observations 208 215 215 217 205
Studies 69 70 70 70 63
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Response variable: the approximated t-statistic of the estimate of the percentage






denote signicance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.
The outcomes of the mixed-eects estimator are presented in Table 2. OLS with standard
errors clustered at the study level are reported in the Appendix: Table A1 gives even more
signicant results for publication bias. The within-study correlation is large, indicating that the
mixed-eects estimator is more appropriate, which is conrmed by likelihood-ratio tests. We also
experimented with several nested mixed-eects models (available in the online appendix), but
they yield qualitatively similar outcomes. Compared with the simple average, the response of
prices corrected for publication bias is more positive (that is, weaker), corroborating evidence for
publication selection in favor of the stronger responses of prices to monetary policy contraction.
Moreover, the magnitude of publication bias increases with the time horizon after the shock.
This result is in line with Doucouliagos & Stanley (2008), who nd stronger publication selection
for research questions with weaker theory competition. For the short run, some disagreement
occurs regarding the eects of monetary policy on prices because of the cost channel. On the
other hand, a consensus emerges about the long-run eect: prices should eventually decrease
after monetary policy tightening; estimates showing the opposite would be dicult to publish.
The impulse-response function corrected for publication bias is depicted in Figure 4: it
exhibits the price puzzle. In the short run prices increase, but in the medium run they decrease
and bottom out 18 months after the tightening. The maximum decrease in the price level,
however, is negligible: only 0.02%. Compared to the average response reported in Figure 2,
now the function shifts upwards|especially in the long run, because publication bias is ltered
out. Figure 4 would be our best estimate of the underlying impulse response if all heterogeneity
between studies was random; the estimate is unconditional on the characteristics of the countries
examined and on the methodology used. In the next section we relax the assumption of random
heterogeneity and explain the dierences in the reported estimates.
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5 What Explains Heterogeneity
As motivation for the empirical investigation of structural heterogeneity consider Figure 5,
which depicts the dierences in monetary transmission among selected countries. We use a sim-
ple random-eects meta-analysis to compute impulse-response functions. Simple meta-analysis
weights each estimate by its precision and adds an estimate-specic random eect; it does not
correct for publication bias. We use simple meta-analysis for estimation by countries since it
requires fewer degrees of freedom than meta-regression. Figure 5 shows that the impulse re-
sponses for the United States, the United Kingdom, and Japan exhibit the price puzzle, but
that monetary transmission in euro area countries seems to work intuitively and prices decline
soon after a tightening. Nevertheless, a part of these dierences may arise from the use of
diverse methods since some countries are examined only in a few studies.
To account for heterogeneity we extend the meta-regression (5) to the following multivariate
version:








+ j + ij; (6)
where Z denotes explanatory variables assumed to aect the reported estimates. The exogeneity
assumptions become jjSEij;Zijk  N(0; ) and ijjSEij;j;Zijk  N(0;).
Table 3 presents descriptions and summary statistics of all the explanatory variables we
consider. In principle, they can be divided into ve groups: variables capturing the funda-
mental characteristics of the economy (structural heterogeneity), data characteristics control
for dierences in the data used, specication characteristics control for dierences in the basic
design of the estimated models, estimation characteristics control for dierences in econometric
techniques, and publication characteristics controlmainly for dierences in quality not captured
by other variables.
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Table 3: Description and summary statistics of regression variables
Variable Description Mean Std. dev.
Response (3M) The percentage response of prices 3 months after a tightening. -0.034 0.692
Response (6M) The percentage response of prices 6 months after a tightening. -0.067 0.883
Response (12M) The percentage response of prices 12 months after a tightening. -0.136 1.012
Response (18M) The percentage response of prices 18 months after a tightening. -0.216 1.327
Response (36M) The percentage response of prices 36 months after a tightening. -0.561 1.714
1=SE The precision of the estimate of the response (all horizons). 6.805 7.821
Structural heterogeneity
GDP per capita The logarithm of the country's real GDP per capita. 9.881 0.414
GDP growth The average growth rate of the country's real GDP. 2.668 1.035
Ination The average ination of the country. 7.748 14.26
Ination volatility The standard deviation of the country's Hodrick-Prescott-
ltered ination.
6.234 33.43
Continued on next page
16Table 3: Description and summary statistics of regression variables (continued)
Variable Description Mean Std. dev.
Financial develop-
ment
The nancial development of the country measured by (domestic
credit to private sector)/GDP.
0.837 0.414
Openness The trade openness of the country measured by (exports + im-
ports)/GDP.
0.460 0.401
CB independence A measure of central bank independence (Arnone et al., 2009). 0.774 0.143
Data characteristics
Monthly =1 if monthly data are used. 0.630 0.483
Time span The number of years of the data used in the estimation. 18.83 10.44
No. of observations The logarithm of the number of observations used. 4.889 0.675
Average year The average year of the data used (2000 as a base). -8.926 7.881
Specication characteristics
GDP deator =1 if the GDP deator is used instead of the consumer price
index as a measure of prices.
0.177 0.382
Single regime =1 if the VAR is estimated over a period of a single monetary
policy regime.
0.296 0.457
No. of lags The number of lags in the model, normalized by frequency:
lags/frequency
0.610 0.370
Commodity prices =1 if a commodity price index is included. 0.607 0.489
Money =1 if a monetary aggregate is included. 0.529 0.499
Foreign variables =1 if at least one foreign variable is included. 0.441 0.497
Time trend =1 if a time trend is included. 0.126 0.332
Seasonal =1 if seasonal dummies are included. 0.146 0.354





=1 if industrial production is used as a measure of economic
activity.
0.430 0.495
Output gap =1 if the output gap is used as a measure of economic activity. 0.028 0.165




BVAR =1 if a Bayesian VAR is estimated. 0.144 0.352
FAVAR =1 if a factor-augmented VAR is estimated. 0.051 0.221
SVAR =1 if non-recursive identication is employed. 0.295 0.456
Sign restrictions =1 if sign restrictions are employed. 0.144 0.352
Publication characteristics
Study citations The logarithm of [(Google Scholar citations of the study)/(age
of the study) + 1].
1.882 1.279
Impact The recursive RePEc impact factor of the outlet. 0.888 2.274
Central banker =1 if at least one co-author is aliated with a central bank. 0.451 0.498
Policymaker =1 if at least one co-author is aliated with a Ministry of Fi-
nance, IMF, OECD, or BIS.
0.055 0.228
Native =1 if at least one co-author is native to the investigated country. 0.446 0.497
Publication year The year of publication (2000 as a base). 5.032 3.886
17Structural heterogeneity When constructing the variables that capture structural hetero-
geneity, we use the average values which correspond with the sample employed in the estimation
of the impulse response. For instance, in the case of ination: When the impulse response comes
from a VAR model estimated on the 1990:1{1999:12 Italian data, we use the average ination
rate in Italy for the period 1990{1999. This approach increases the variability in regressors and
describes the estimates more precisely than using the same year of structural variables for all
extracted impulse responses. The variable GDP per capita reects the importance of the degree
of economic development of the economy for monetary transmission. To investigate whether the
strength of transmission depends on the phase of the economic cycle, we include the variable
GDP growth in the meta-regression.The underlying reason is related to credit market imper-
fections, which could amplify the propagation of monetary policy shocks during bust periods
(Bernanke & Gertler, 1989). Next, we examine the variables implied by the various channels
of the transmission mechanism. We include the trade openness of the economy to capture
the importance of foreign developments for domestic monetary policy as well as the exchange
rate channel of monetary transmission. Furthermore, as pointed out by Bernanke & Gertler
(1995) and Cecchetti (1999), dierences in nancial structure may explain important portions
of heterogeneity in monetary transmission. We include a measure of nancial development
approximated by the ratio of private credit to GDP.
We add the average level and volatility of ination, as these may inuence price setting
behavior as well as monetary transmission (Angeloni et al., 2006). We expect that independent
central banks are likely to have more credibility (Rogo, 1985; Keefer & Stasavage, 2003; Perino,
2010). In consequence, economic subjects may respond more to monetary policy shocks. We test
whether the degree of central bank independence aects the strength of monetary transmission.
Regarding the sources of the data, the trade openness, GDP growth, and GDP level per
capita are obtained from Penn World Tables. The consumer price index, used to compute
average ination and ination volatility, is obtained from the International Monetary Fund's
International Financial Statistics. The ratio of domestic credit to GDP is obtained from the
World Bank's World Development Indicators, and the index of central bank independence is
extracted from Arnone et al. (2009).
Data characteristics We control for the frequency of the data used in the VAR model: 63%
of specications use monthly data, the rest rely on quarterly data. To account for possible
changes in transmission not explained by the structural variables (for example, changes caused
by globalization or nancial innovations, Boivin & Giannoni, 2006), we include the average year
of the sample period used in the estimation. Finally, we add the total number of observations
to assess whether smaller samples yield systematically dierent outcomes.
Specication characteristics To account for the dierent measures of the price level we
include a dummy which equals one when the GDP deator is used instead of the usual consumer
price index (18% of specications in primary studies). We add a dummy for the case where
the data cover a period of a single monetary policy regime (30%). Next, we include the VAR's
18lag order normalized by the data frequency. We account for the cases where commodity prices,
a money aggregate, foreign variables, a time trend, and seasonal dummies are included in the
VAR. We also control for the number of endogenous variables in the model. Since the results
might vary depending on the measure of economic activity, we introduce dummies for the cases
where industrial production, the output gap, or another measure is used instead of GDP.
Estimation characteristics Most of the studies in our sample estimate VAR models using
the standard methods (OLS or Maximum Likelihood); we control for studies using Bayesian
methods to address the problem of overparameterization (14% of specications in primary
studies) and for studies using the FAVAR approach to address the problem of omitted variables
(5%). As for identication strategies, most of the studies employ recursive identication; we
include a dummy for non-recursive identication (30%) and a dummy for identication using
sign restrictions (14%).
Publication characteristics To proxy study quality we use the recursive RePEc impact
factor of the outlet (as the journal coverage of RePEc is much more comprehensive than in
other databases) and the number of Google Scholar citations of the study normalized by the
study's age. We add a dummy for authors aliated with a central bank and a dummy for
authors working at policy-oriented institutions such as a Ministry of Finance, the International
Monetary Fund, or the Bank for International Settlements. We include a dummy for the case
where at least one co-author is \native" to the examined country: such authors may be more
familiar with the data at hand, which could contribute positively to the quality of the analysis;
on the other hand, such authors may have a vested interest in the results. We consider authors
native if they either were born in the country or obtained an academic degree there. Finally,
we use the year of publication to account for possible improvements in methodology that are
otherwise dicult to codify.
In the rst step we estimate a general model containing all explanatory variables; the general
model is not reported but is available in the online appendix. All variance ination factors are
lower than 10, indicating that the degree of multicolinearity is not too problematic. In the
second step, we drop the variables which are, for each horizon, jointly insignicant at the 10%
level.
For example, GDP per capita, the number of lags used, and most publication characteristics
belong to the dropped variables. The insignicance of publication characteristics suggests that
the quality of a given study is to a large extent captured by the methods used.
The resulting, more parsimonious, model is presented in Table 4. The specications re-
ported in this section are based on the mixed-eects multilevel estimator, but the inference
would be similar from an OLS with standard errors clustered at the study level; these robust-
ness checks are available in Appendix A. The similarity between the outcomes of these two
estimators indicates that the exogeneity assumptions made in the mixed-eects estimation are
not seriously violated; in meta-analysis it is dicult to test exogeneity formally because the
19extreme unbalancedness of the data (some studies report only one impulse response) does not
permit the construction of a reasonable xed-eects model. We prefer mixed eects over OLS
because likelihood-ratio tests reject the hypothesis of zero within-study variance, suggesting
that the OLS is misspecied.
Concerning structural heterogeneity, the results reported in Table 4 suggest that GDP
growth, the openness of the economy, the level and volatility of ination, and the degree of
central bank independence systematically aect the estimated impulse response of prices to
monetary tightening in the medium to long run. The importance of monetary policy shocks
weakens in periods of higher GDP growth. This result is consistent with Bernanke & Gertler
(1989), who argue that asymmetric information and other credit market frictions could amplify
the eects of monetary policy through the so-called nancial accelerator. In periods of lower
GDP growth and especially during recessions, rms' dependence on external nancing increases,
and changes in the interest rate become more important.
Table 4: Explaining the dierences in impulse responses
Mixed-eects multilevel
Horizon 3 months 6 months 12 months 18 months 36 months






(0.131) (0.133) (0.132) (0.124) (0.150)
1/SE -0.075 -0.125 -0.287 -0.252 -0.154
(0.117) (0.147) (0.181) (0.169) (0.202)
Structural heterogeneity






(0.008) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012)
Ination 0.001 -0.001 0.003 0.004 0.009

(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Ination volatility -0.0004 0.0004 -0.0011 -0.0019 -0.0044









(0.036) (0.048) (0.064) (0.062) (0.070)




(0.039) (0.049) (0.056) (0.048) (0.042)




(0.070) (0.089) (0.097) (0.085) (0.079)
Data characteristics






(0.017) (0.023) (0.028) (0.028) (0.032)




(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Specication characteristics





(0.023) (0.030) (0.043) (0.051) (0.092)
Single regime 0.028 0.033 0.031 0.026 0.095

(0.020) (0.025) (0.033) (0.035) (0.037)
Continued on next page
20Table 4: Explaining the dierences in impulse responses (continued)
Mixed-eects multilevel











(0.016) (0.021) (0.030) (0.031) (0.033)






(0.017) (0.023) (0.031) (0.034) (0.045)




(0.014) (0.015) (0.022) (0.025) (0.049)







(0.023) (0.027) (0.035) (0.038) (0.039)







(0.162) (0.136) (0.084) (0.070) (0.036)
Other measures -0.072

-0.036 -0.059 -0.041 -0.026








































(0.036) (0.051) (0.069) (0.083) (0.141)
Publication characteristics















(0.034) (0.043) (0.040) (0.038) (0.045)
Within-study correlation 0.32 0.37 0.32 0.37 0.43
Observations 208 215 215 217 205
Studies 69 70 70 70 63
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Response variable: the approximated t-statistic of the estimate of
the percentage response of prices to a one-percentage-point increase in the interest rate. All explanatory






denote signicance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.
The expectation channel of monetary transmission can explain why the impact of monetary
policy diminishes in periods of higher ination: high ination impedes the credibility of the
central bank and restricts its ability to control the price level. Furthermore, our results indicate
that a higher volatility of ination strengthens the eect on prices in the long run. This is likely
to be a consequence of monetary policy shocks having more lasting eects in more volatile
environments (Mohanty & Turner, 2008). Next, monetary policy is more eective in open
economies, where its impact can be amplied through the exchange rate channel. Following a
contractionary monetary policy shock, the real exchange rate appreciates through the uncovered
21interest parity condition. As a result, imported goods become less expensive, amplifying the
drop in the aggregate price level caused by monetary tightening (Dennis et al., 2007). As
expected, monetary policy is more powerful if the central bank enjoys more independence,
which corresponds with the ndings of Alesina & Summers (1993).
In contrast, the structural variables (that is, those related to fundamentals) are not so
signicant for the short-run response, with the exception of the nancial development indicator.
Our results suggest that higher development of the nancial system weakens the short-run
impact of monetary policy. This nding complies with Cecchetti (1999), who reports that the
eects of monetary policy are more important in countries with many small banks, less healthy
banking systems, and underdeveloped capital markets.
Concerning data characteristics, the results presented in Table 4 indicate that the number
of observations systematically inuences the estimated long-run eect: more data make the
reported response of prices weaker. In line with Boivin & Giannoni (2006), who put forward
that globalization coupled with nancial innovations may dampen the eects of monetary policy
shocks on the economy, the reported long-run response weakens when newer data are used.
Specication characteristics are found to be important as well. The GDP deator reacts less to
monetary tightening than does the consumer price index. The inclusion of commodity prices
is important for all horizons and amplies the estimated decrease in prices. When industrial
production is used instead of GDP as a measure of economic activity, the reported response is
typically weaker; on the other hand, the reported response strengthens when the output gap is
used.
Estimation methods are important especially for the short-run response. For the 3- and
6-month horizons, Bayesian estimation produces a smaller decrease in prices compared with the
simple VAR. The use of FAVAR, non-recursive identication, and sign restrictions contributes to
reporting more potent monetary policy. It is worth noting that all methodological explanations
of the price puzzle that were discussed in Section 3 indeed contribute to alleviating the puzzle
and therefore to estimating intuitive impulse responses (with the exception of the eect of a
single regime of monetary policy, which has the opposite sign, but is statistically insignicant).
Our results suggest that authors aliated with central banks report less powerful monetary
policy (that is, are more likely to report the price puzzle). This seems counterintuitive since it
might be expected that central bankers have a vested interest in presenting a well-functioning
monetary transmission mechanism. On the other hand, central bank employees may engage
less in publication selection|they produce papers needed by their employers and often submit
them to academic journals only as a by-product.
The multivariate meta-regression corroborates the evidence for publication selection re-
ported in Section 4. The intercept, a measure of publication bias, is statistically signicant for
the 12-, 18-, and 36-month horizons. The estimate of the true eect in the multivariate model,
however, is not simply represented by the regression coecient for 1=SE, but is conditional on
the variables capturing heterogeneity. In order to estimate the true eect we need to choose the
preferred values of the explanatory variables, thus dening some sort of best practice; in this
22way we create a synthetic study with ideal parameters. A suitably dened best-practice estima-
tion can lter out misspecication bias from the literature, although the approach is subjective
since dierent researchers may have dierent opinions on what constitutes best practice.
We dene best practice by selecting methodology characteristics based on the discussion in
Section 3: we prefer the output gap over GDP as a measure of economic activity, non-recursive
identication over the simple VAR, data covering a single monetary policy regime over mixing
more regimes, and the inclusion of commodity prices and foreign variables instead of omitting
them. In addition, we prefer Bayesian estimation since overparameterization can be a problem
even for systems of modest size (Banbura et al., 2010). We insert sample maximums for the
number of observations, the year of the data, and the number of endogenous variables. Country-
specic variables and dummy variables for central bankers and policymakers are set to their
sample means.
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Note: Confidence bands are constructed as +/- one standard error.
The estimated impulse response implied by best practice is depicted in the bottom part of
Figure 7: after controlling for both publication and misspecication biases, the price puzzle is not
present and prices bottom out six months after a one-percentage-point increase in the interest
rate. The maximum decrease in the price level reaches 0.33% and is statistically signicant
at the 5% level. The transmission of monetary policy shocks is quick, which contrasts with
the view held at many central banks that there are long lags in the eects of monetary policy
on prices (for instance, Bank of England, 1999; European Central Bank, 2010). The absence
of the price puzzle is robust both individually and cumulatively to other possible denitions
of best practice: selecting the FAVAR approach instead of the Bayesian approach, selecting
the specication using sign restrictions instead of non-recursive identication, or selecting the
sample mean of the number of endogenous variables in the VAR system instead of the sample
maximum. The price puzzle does not occur even if we set the level of nancial development to
the sample maximum.
23Table 5: Consequences of misspecications
Linear combination of regressors' values
Horizon 3 months 6 months 12 months 18 months 36 months





Without output gap 0.092 -0.028 -0.006 -0.024 -0.131
Without gap and SVAR 0.160

0.082 0.117 0.115 -0.061









Note: The values represent the percentage response of prices to a one-percentage-point increase in the interest rate.
Without output gap = Best practice omitting output gap. Without gap and SVAR = Best practice omitting output
gap and using recursive identication. Without gap, SVAR, and commodity prices = Best practice omitting output gap,






denote signicance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.
To illustrate the consequences of misspecications for the reported impulse responses, Table 5
and Figure 7 investigate the cases where some aspects of methodology deviate from best practice.
When the model does not control for the potential output of the economy, the price puzzle
occurs, but prices decline in the medium and long run. When the model combines the omission
of the output gap with the use of recursive identication, the puzzle gets stronger, becomes
statistically signicant, and prices decline below the initial level only after 18 months. When
the model additionally omits a measure of commodity prices, the price level is reported never
to decline below the initial level during the 3-year horizon after monetary tightening. In sum,
our analysis of the VAR studies on monetary transmission indicates that the price puzzle arises
largely from misspecications of the estimated models.
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246 Conclusion
We examine the impact of monetary policy shocks on the price level by quantitatively reviewing
the impulse-response functions from previously published VAR studies on monetary transmis-
sion. We collect impulse response estimates for 31 countries produced by 103 researchers and
regress the estimates on variables capturing study design and author and country characteristics.
To account for within-study dependence in the estimates, we employ mixed-eects multilevel
meta-regression. Recently developed meta-analysis methods allow us to estimate the underlying
eect of monetary policy implied by the entire literature net of the bias caused by publication
selection and the misspecications of some VAR models in primary studies.
Our results indicate that the estimates reporting more powerful monetary policy (that is,
a greater decrease in the price level following monetary tightening) tend to be preferentially
selected for publication. The longer the horizon after a tightening, the stronger the selection.
In the short run, some theory competition exists for the direction of the response since the
counterintuitive increase in prices can be explained by the cost channel. In contrast, no widely
accepted theory can explain why prices should stay above the initial level in the long run.
This relation between publication selection and theory competition corroborates the ndings
of Doucouliagos & Stanley (2008), who report a similar phenomenon for many other areas
of empirical research. The VAR literature on monetary transmission, on average, seems to
exaggerate the long-run response of prices to monetary policy shocks.
The responses are systematically aected by study design and country-specic structural
characteristics. Study design is important in particular for the short run. The reported short-
run increase in prices after a tightening is well explained by the eects of commonly questioned
aspects of methodology, such as the omission of commodity prices, the omission of potential
output, or the use of recursive identication. When these are ltered out, the impulse-response
function inferred from the entire literature becomes hump-shaped with no evidence of the price
puzzle. The maximum decrease in the price level following a one-percentage-point increase in
the interest rate reaches 0.33% and already occurs half a year after the tightening.
The long-run response depends on the characteristics of the examined country; on aver-
age, the decrease in prices is relatively persistent. The eect of monetary policy is weaker in
countries with higher average ination, possibly because high ination hampers the credibility
of the central bank. The eect is stronger in more open economies, in countries with a more
independent central bank, and during recessions.
The robustness of our results could be further examined by adding all unpublished stud-
ies to the data sample; this would require collecting information from hundreds of additional
manuscripts, but would enable the researcher, for instance, to focus exclusively on one selected
country. Researchers may conduct a meta-analysis of the eect of monetary policy on the rate
of ination (in this paper we include only studies using the price level for compatibility). In
addition, the presented method of quantitative synthesis for graphical results can be applied to
any other eld that uses VARs as a research tool.
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28Appendix A: Robustness Checks
Table A1: Test of publication bias and true eect, OLS
OLS with clustered standard errors
Horizon 3 months 6 months 12 months 18 months 36 months















(0.014) (0.021) (0.016) (0.014) (0.008)
R
2 0.05 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.01
Observations 208 215 215 217 205
Studies 69 70 70 70 63
Note: Standard errors, clustered at the study level, in parentheses. Response variable: the approximated t-statistic of






denote signicance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.
Table A2: Explaining the dierences in impulse responses, OLS
OLS with clustered standard errors
Horizon 3 months 6 months 12 months 18 months 36 months






(0.151) (0.133) (0.128) (0.120) (0.130)
1/SE -0.058 -0.106 -0.237 -0.168 -0.028








(0.008) (0.010) (0.013) (0.014) (0.024)




(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)










(0.030) (0.054) (0.076) (0.073) (0.067)






(0.031) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.117)




(0.068) (0.106) (0.133) (0.123) (0.061)
Data characteristics










(0.011) (0.019) (0.023) (0.025) (0.047)




(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Specication characteristics






(0.013) (0.021) (0.039) (0.046) (0.060)
Single regime 0.038

0.034 0.024 0.021 0.109

Continued on next page
29Table A2: Explaining the dierences in impulse responses, OLS (continued)
OLS with clustered standard errors
Horizon 3 months 6 months 12 months 18 months 36 months











(0.008) (0.018) (0.023) (0.027) (0.059)







(0.015) (0.013) (0.030) (0.038) (0.055)










(0.012) (0.011) (0.016) (0.022) (0.038)
















































































(0.023) (0.022) (0.033) (0.032) (0.033)
R
2 0.59 0.58 0.48 0.47 0.45
Observations 208 215 215 217 205
Studies 69 70 70 70 63
Note: Standard errors, clustered at the study level, in parentheses. Response variable: the approximated
t-statistic of the estimate of the percentage response of prices to a one-percentage-point increase in the
interest rate. All explanatory variables are divided by the approximated standard error of the estimate






denote signicance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.
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